The Dynamics Behind the India-Pakistan Clash

Early on Wednesday morning, India launched military strikes against Pakistan, killing more than thirty people, according to the Pakistani government. Yesterday, the Indian government claimed that Pakistan had responded with extensive drone strikes of its own. It is the largest military confrontation between India and Pakistan in decades. The two countries have been in conflict with each other for more than seventy-five years; this latest volley was set off when twenty-five Indian tourists were killed in a terrorist attack last month in the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. (A local Kashmiri resident was also killed.) The Kashmir region has a long history of militant activity, some of it funded and sponsored by Pakistan, and of opposition to Indian rule. The majority of Kashmir acceded to India after the 1947 Partition, and the Indian government has committed extensive human-rights violations there. In 2019, Narendra Modi, India’s Prime Minister, revoked Kashmir’s special status under the Indian constitution, which it was granted as the only state in India with a Muslim majority. Since then, India has further cracked down on dissent in the region, while at the same time increasing tourism there. Now there is considerable fear that the conflict between India and Pakistan, both of which have nuclear weapons, could escalate.

I recently spoke by phone with Sushant Singh, a lecturer in South Asian studies at Yale, and a consulting editor with The Caravan magazine, about the current situation. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we also discussed how the political dynamics in both India and Pakistan could contribute to a widening of the conflict, the Indian government’s long-term failures in Kashmir, and why the world’s embrace of Modi has made him less likely to seek peace.

What about this situation feels new or different, for either Indians or Pakistanis or Kashmiris?

The one big difference this time was visible in Kashmir, after these tourists were shot down. For the first time in a long, long while, we saw Kashmiris come out in significant numbers and protest against killings. There were candlelight marches, there were protests, there were people publicly condemning it. It has been very difficult over the past thirty or thirty-five years to have Kashmiris come out in support of India, in a certain sense, or against armed militants who have been advocating separatism or pro-Pakistan politics in Kashmir. It was a great opportunity for Mr. Modi’s government, but Mr. Modi’s government did not take that opportunity. They continued with their policies of demolition of houses of suspected militants, and oppressive security operations to arrest a large number of young men, which clearly does not help anything. It was a great opportunity for him to take advantage of, which he did not take.

How do you understand this response from the Kashmiris?

Tourism has been a big feature of the Kashmiri economy and Kashmiri society, and tourists have always been seen as guests. To see tourists being picked out and killed in these numbers was a reversal of everything that they have stood for over the years. Not only in terms of Kashmiriyat, one aspect of which is the idea of tourists being guests, but also in terms of the economic damage that it causes.

You described this as an opportunity that you think Modi has missed. What exactly was that opportunity, and what do you think the Indian government wants to do instead?

So the opportunity was very simple. He could have announced certain steps to politically engage with the state, and to support tourism, because Indian tourists are not going to go to Kashmir now. There’ve been a large number of cancellations that have happened. He could have announced some form of subsidy, some form of economic support for the hotels and tourist guides and for other people who are associated with local tourism. He could have highlighted the fact that a young Kashmiri man was killed while trying to save Indian tourists. He could have also highlighted that a large number of Kashmiri taxi-drivers and hospital workers, etc., went out of their way to help the Indian tourists after this heinous attack. He did not do any of that. He could have even taken this moment to announce some bold steps like the restoration of statehood to Kashmir, or empowering Kashmir in a big way. There could have been small tactical steps, which would have helped in an administrative manner but also large, bold political steps to engage the Kashmiris and try and win them over.

But just to be clear: He turned down this opportunity not because he is insufficiently bold or because he’s cowardly, but, rather, because he does not want to take this opportunity for ideological reasons, correct?

Absolutely. Hindutva ideology, which Modi subscribes to, sees Kashmir as a land rather than a people. Whereas, fundamentally, what I am arguing is that Kashmir is about the people more than the land. We should try and win over the Kashmiris, and not just look at how we can control the land.

What feels different or not different this time about the dynamic between India and Pakistan?

There is a strong similarity to what happened in 2019, when Indian troops were killed in Pulwama by a young suicide bomber, and then Indian Air Force fighter jets tried to strike a seminary in Balakot, in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan. Pakistan retaliated, and there was an aerial clash, an Indian MiG-21 plane was shot down, an Indian pilot was captured, a fighter jet was allegedly shot down, and the Indians shot down their own helicopter, and so on and so forth.

But what is most stunning here is the range of targets chosen by India and where those targets are. These nine targets which India claims to have hit have been chosen not only in Pakistani Kashmir but also in Punjab. Now, Balakot was also outside Kashmir, but it was in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is a tribal area, and not really seen as part of the Pakistani heartland. Whereas Punjab is the heartland of Pakistan. It is the most dominant province, it is the most populous province, it is politically the most powerful province. And even within Punjab, one of these strikes actually targeted Muridke, which is just outside of Lahore. To take one of the biggest cities in South Asia and have your military strike it with some form of weaponry is something that has not been seen outside of full-fledged wars. So that is the big difference. And all of these places essentially are madrassas, or Islamic seminaries. So these targets can be thought of as provocative and escalatory in nature.

But I must also clarify that in all of the statements that the Indian government has put out, it has tried to say that these strikes were precise, very targeted, and non-escalatory. They’ve been emphasizing the non-escalatory nature of strikes constantly, even in conversation with foreign diplomats. I think there’s some fear in Mr. Modi’s government, that these strikes should not lead to an escalation which gets out of hand.

But then how do you understand that contradiction, which is that they struck targets in Punjab, but at the same time they are trying to prevent escalation?

Yeah, so there’s definitely a contradiction and a tension here, and a very high risk. There will always be a risk of escalation. But they are highlighting the fact that they have only gone for non-military targets, have said that they are not trying to target civilians, that these targets are just terror infrastructure, and were only bombed at night to limit the casualties. And as media reports have suggested, these madrassas or seminaries had already been vacated earlier. So the way they have tried to manage it is by minimizing the number of casualties and by messaging. But does it really help? Does it really allow them to bridge the contradiction, or to ride two boats at the same time? Only time will tell.

What are the Modi government’s long-term goals here? It sounds like what you’re saying, to read between the lines, is that they want to have some sort of strike that establishes deterrence or nationalist bona fides, but at the same time doesn’t lead to a larger war, right?

Yeah, but I would not call it deterrence. There would be no deterrence unless you target the Pakistani military. Deterrence cannot be established by targeting some seminaries. I think the main purpose of these strikes is to strengthen his own nationalist bona fides, and to satisfy and assuage the very heightened emotion that India’s mass media has generated over the past two weeks at the behest of the government.

Right, I was about to say that the heightened emotion and the press coverage seem to be occurring, in part, thanks to the ruling party.

Exactly. That’s what I’m saying. It is at the behest of Mr. Modi’s government, and they’re doing it willingly as an accomplice, as propagandists. It is manufactured, but it also taps into something and builds a narrative and helps build Mr. Modi’s image as this strongman and as a bold leader, as a heroic leader who has taken this great decision [to strike Pakistan]. Is there a strategic view to this? Will it deter future violent incidents by militants or gunmen or terrorists, whatever you wish to call them? No. Clearly no. 2019 has already shown us that it is not possible to create deterrence like this. If there was a strategic view, then India would already have a larger gamut of options going in various domains. More broadly, and not just in terms of this week, India would probably be engaging on the economic front, on the diplomatic front, on the cultural front, on the people-to-people front, and on the military front with both punishment and reward.